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Abstract—The emerging applications of machine learning algo-
rithms on mobile devices motivate us to offload the computation
tasks of training a model or deploying a trained one to the cloud
or at the edge of the network. One of the major challenges
in this setup is to guarantee the privacy of the client data.
Various methods have been proposed to protect privacy in the
literature. Those include (i) adding noise to the client data, which
reduces the accuracy of the result, (ii) using secure multiparty
computation (MPC), which requires significant communication
among the computing nodes or with the client, (iii) relying
on homomorphic encryption (HE) methods, which significantly
increases computation load at the servers. In this paper, we
propose Corella as an alternative approach to protect the privacy
of data. The proposed scheme relies on a cluster of servers,
where at most T ∈ N of them may collude, each running a
learning model (e.g., a deep neural network). Each server is
fed with the client data, added with strong noise, independent
from user data. The variance of the noise is set to be large
enough to make the information leakage to any subset of up
to T servers information-theoretically negligible. On the other
hand, the added noises for different servers are correlated. This
correlation among the queries allows the parameters of the
models running on different servers to be trained such that the
client can mitigate the contribution of the noises by combining
the outputs of the servers, and recover the final result with
high accuracy and with a minor computational effort. In other
words, instead of running a learning algorithm on top of a
privacy-preserving platform, enabled by MPC or HE, in the
proposed approach, the model is trained in presence of the
strong noises, correlated across the servers, to achieve high
accuracy, without communication and computation overheads of
MPC or HE. We evaluate Corella framework for two learning
algorithms, the classification, using deep neural networks, and
the autoencoder, as supervised and unsupervised learning tasks,
respectively. Simulation results for various datasets demonstrate
the accuracy of the proposed approach for both problems.
Index Terms—Privacy Preserving Machine Learning, Private
Edge Computing, Secure Machine Learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the expansion of machine learning (ML) applications,
dealing with high dimensional datasets and models, partic-
ularly for the low resource devices (e.g., mobile units), it
is inevitable to offload heavy computation and storage tasks
to the cloud servers. This raises a list of challenges such as
communication overhead, delay, operation cost, etc. One of the
major concerns, which is becoming increasingly important, is
maintaining the privacy of the used datasets, either the training
dataset or the user dataset, such that the level of information
leakage to the cloud servers is under control.
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The information leakage of the training dataset may occur
either during the training phase or from the trained model. In
the training phase privacy, a data owner that offloads the task
of training to some untrusted servers is concerned about the
privacy of his sampled data. In the trained model privacy, the
concern is to prevent the trained model to expose information
about the training dataset. On the other hand, in the user
data privacy, a client wishes to employ some server(s) to run
an already trained model on his dataset while preserving the
privacy of his dataset against curiosity of servers.
There are various techniques to provide privacy in machine
learning, with the following three major categories:
1) Randomization, Perturbation, and Adding Noise:
Applying these techniques to the client data or the ML
model can be used to confuse the servers and to reduce
the level of information leakage, at the cost of sacrificing
the accuracy of the results.
In [1], [2], it is shown that parameters of a trained model
can leak sensitive information about the training dataset.
Various approaches based on the concept of differential
privacy [3], [4], [5] have been proposed to provide
privacy to reduce this leakage. A randomized algorithm
is differentially private if its output distributions for any
two input adjacent datasets, i.e., two datasets that differ
only in one element, are close enough. This technique
has been applied to principal component analysis (PCA)
[6], [7], support vector machines (SVM) [8], linear
and logistic regression [9], [10], deep neural networks
(DNNs) [11], [12], and distributed and federated learn-
ing [13], [14]. The caveat is that the privacy-accuracy
tradeoff in these approaches [15] bounds the scale of
randomization and thus limits its ability to preserve
privacy.
K-anonymity [16], [17], [18] is another privacy preserv-
ing framework, in which the data items, related to one
individual cannot be distinguished from the data items
of at least K − 1 other individuals in the released data.
It is known that K-anonymity framework would not
guarantee a reasonable privacy, particularly for high-
dimensional data [19], [20].
2) Secure Multiparty Computation: This approach ex-
ploits the existence of a cluster of servers, some of
them non-colluding, to guarantee information-theoretic
privacy in some classes of computation tasks like the
polynomial functions [21], [22], [23]. This approach
can be applied to protect the privacy of the data, while
executing an ML algorithm on that cluster [24], [25],
[26]. In other words, MPC algorithms have been math-
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2ematically designed such that, the computation is done
accurately, while the privacy is guaranteed perfectly. On
top of this private and accurate layer of computation, any
algorithm can be executed, including ML algorithms,
which can be represented (or approximated) with some
polynomial computation in each round. The shortcoming
of this solution is that it costs the network a huge com-
munication overhead, that scales with the degree of the
polynomials. To reduce this communication overhead,
one solution is to judiciously approximate the functions
with some lower-degree polynomials such that the num-
ber of interaction among the servers is reduced to some
extent [27]. Another solution is to rely on Lagrange
coding to develop an MPC with no communication
among servers [28]. That approach can also exploit the
gain of parallel computation. The major disadvantage
of [28] is that this time the number of required servers
scales with the degree of the polynomials.
3) Homomorphic Encryption: Homomorphic encryp-
tion [29] is another cryptography tool that can be
applied for ML applications [30], [31], [32], [33]. It
creates a cryptographically secure framework between
the client and the servers, that allows the untrusted
servers to process the encrypted data directly. However
computation overhead of HE schemes is very high. This
disadvantage is directly reflected in the time needed
to train a model or use a trained one as reported in
[34], [35]. On the other hand, this framework is based
on computational hardness assumption, and does not
guarantee information-theoretic privacy.
A. Our contributions
In this paper, we propose Corella as an alternative approach
to preserve privacy in offloading ML algorithms, based on
sending correlated queries to the servers. These correlated
queries are generated by adding strong noises to the user
data, where the added noises are independent of the data
itself, but correlated across the servers. The variance of the
noises is large, which makes the information leakage to the
servers negligible. On the other hand, the correlation among
the noises allows us to train the parameters of the model
such that the user can mitigate the contribution of the noises
and recover the result by combining the answers received
from the servers. Note that in this method each server runs
a regular machine learning model (say a deep neural network)
with no computation overhead. In addition, there is absolutely
no communication among the servers. Indeed, servers may
not even be aware of the existence of each other. Thus
the proposed scheme provides information-theoretic privacy,
while maintaining the communication and computation costs
affordable, and still achieves high accuracy.
In particular, we assume a client with limited computation
and storage resources who wishes to run an ML task on his
data. Thus for processing, it relies on a cluster of N ∈ N
servers. We consider a semi-honest setup, meaning that all
servers are honest in compliance with the protocol, but an
arbitrary subset of up to T ∈ N of them may collude to
learn about data. Corella framework is designed for this setup
by feeding correlated noisy data to each server. The added
noises are designed such that the information leakage to any
T colluding servers remains negligible, while the system can
be trained to achieve high accuracy. We apply Corella for both
supervised and unsupervised learning.
In summary, Corella offers the following desirable features:
1) Thanks to the designed strong noise added to the user
data, the information leakage to any subset of up to T
servers is negligible.
2) The correlation among the noises enables the system to
be trained such that the user can mitigate the contribution
of the noises by combining the correlated answers and
recover the final result with high accuracy.
3) There is no communication among the servers. Indeed,
the servers may not be aware of the existence of the
others. Moreover, the computation load per server is the
same as running a classical learning algorithm, e.g., a
deep neural network.
In other words, the proposed scheme resolves the tension
between privacy and accuracy, and still avoids the huge
computation and communication load (or employing a large
number of servers), needed in HE and MPC schemes. This
is particularly important, when communication resources are
scarce, e.g., wireless networks.
Remark 1: Note that in the schemes based on randomiza-
tion, perturbation, and adding noise, there is no opportunity
to effectively eliminate the contribution of those privacy-
protective actions (i.e., the added confusion). Thus, increasing
the strength of those actions, e.g., noise variance, to improve
the privacy will deteriorate the level of accuracy. This chal-
lenge has been resolved in Corella, by adding correlated noises
for different servers. This provides the opportunity for the
system to mitigate the contribution of the noises by combining
the output of the servers. Indeed, the system gradually learns
to exploit this opportunity during the training phase. However,
in conventional schemes based on randomization, perturbation,
and adding noise, this opportunity does not basically exist to
be exploited.
On the other hand, in MPC based schemes, the noises
added for different servers are correlated. This is similar to
what we do in Corella. However, in MPC, the algorithm
is developed to completely eliminate the added noises. In
other words, unlike Corella, the system does not learn to
mitigate the effect of the noises, but has been mathematically
designed to absolutely remove them. This is done at the cost of
prohibitive communication load among the servers, or using
extra servers, proportional to the degree of the function for
polynomial models in both cases. However, in Corella, the
model, including the one deployed in the servers and pre-
and post-processing ones in the client, is gradually trained to
mitigate the contribution of the noises. This means that in
the initial iterations of the learning phase, the effect of the
noises is not taken care of, however, thorough learning, the
effect of the noises will be mitigated. This is done without any
communication among the servers and with very few servers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
formally presents Corella framework. Section III is indicated
3to explaining how to use Corella framework for two popular
learning tasks. In Section IV, the experimental results are
discussed. Section V is dedicated to concluding remarks.
B. Notations
Capital italic bold letter X denotes a random vector. Capital
non-italic bold letter X denotes a random matrix. Capital non-
italic non-bold letter X denotes a deterministic matrix. I(X ;Y )
indicates the mutual information between the two random
vectors X and Y . For a function g, the computation cost
(e.g., the number of multiplications) and storage cost (e.g.,
the number of parameters) are denoted as Cc(g) and Cs(g),
respectively. Normalized(X), for X = [x1, . . . , xn]> ∈ Rn, is
defined as X−µσ , where µ =
1
n
∑n
i=1 xi and σ
2 = 1n
∑n
i=1(xi−µ)2.
log x is calculated in base 2 (i.e., log2 x). For T ∈ N,
[T] = {1, . . . ,T}. N(µ, σ2) denotes Gaussian distribution with
mean µ and variance σ2. W[:, {t1, . . . , tT }] denotes a submatrix
of W, consisting of the columns t1, . . . , tT of matrix W.
II. GENERAL CORELLA FRAMEWORK
We consider a system including a client, with limited
computation and storage resources, and N servers. The client
has an individual data and wishes to run an ML algorithm
(e.g., deep neural networks, autoencoder) on it with the aid of
the servers, while he wishes to keep his data private from the
servers. All servers are honest, except up to T < N of them,
which are semi-honest. It means that all servers follow the
protocol, but an arbitrary subset of up to T servers may collude
to gain information about the client data. The client sends
queries to the servers, and then by combining the received
answers, he will derive the result. In other words, we are
concerned about privacy of the client data.
The system is operated in two phases, the training phase,
and then the inference phase.
In the training phase, the dataset Sm =
{(X (1),Y (1)), . . . , (X (m),Y (m))} consisting of m ∈ N samples
are used by the client to train the model, where (X (i),Y (i))
denotes the data sample and its target (e.g., label in the
supervised learning), for i = 1, . . . ,m. In addition, the client
generates m independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
noise samples Zm = {(Z (1)1 , . . . , Z (1)N ), . . . , (Z (m)1 , . . . , Z (m)N )},
where each noise sample (Z (i)1 , . . . , Z (i)N ), with N correlated
components, is sampled from a joint distribution
PZ = PZ1,...,ZN . The noise components are independent
of dataset Sm.
The data flow diagram is shown in Fig. 1, where for
simplicity, the sample index (i) is omitted from the variables.
For i = 1 . . .m, the client, having access to dataset Sm and
noise component set Zm, uses a preprocessing function gPre
to generate N queries(
Q1(X (i), Z (i)1 ), . . . ,QN (X (i), Z (i)N )
)
= gPre (X (i), Z (i)), (1)
and sends Q j(X (i), Z (i)j ) to the j-th server, for j = 1, . . . , N .
In response, the j-th server applies a function (a model) fj ,
which will be trained, and generates the answer A(i)j as,
A(i)j = fj(Q j(X (i), Z (i)j )). (2)
Client
Client
Server Server
Z1, ...,ZN
X
Yˆ
f1 fN
A1 AN
. . .
1 N
Q1(X,Z1) QN(X,ZN)
gPre
gPost
Fig. 1: The general Corella framework for privacy preserving
ML
By combining all answers from N servers using a post-
processing function gPost , the client estimates the target,
Yˆ
(i)
= gPost (A(i)1 , . . . , A(i)N ), (3)
while the information leakage from the set of queries to any
arbitrary T servers must be negligible.
In the training phase, the goal is to design or train the set
of functions F = {gPre, gPost, f1, . . . , fN } and PZ according to
the following optimization problem
min
F , PZ
1
m
m∑
i=1
L{Yˆ (i),Y (i)}
s.t. I
(
X (i);
{
Q j(X (i), Z (i)j ), j ∈ T
}) ≤ ε,
∀i ∈ [m],
∀T ⊂ [N], |T | ≤ T
(4)
where L{Yˆ (i),Y (i)} shows the loss function between Yˆ (i) and
Y (i), for some loss function L and the constraint guarantees
to preserve ε-privacy in terms of information leakage through
any set of T queries, for some privacy parameter ε ∈ R≥0. We
desire that the computation and storage costs of gPre and gPost
be low.
In the inference phase, to deploy this model to estimate
the target of a new input X , the client chooses (Z1, . . . , ZN ),
sampled from designed distribution PZ, independent of all
other variables in the network, and follows the same protocol
and uses the designed or trained functions set F .
This framework can apply to both supervised and unsuper-
vised ML algorithms. In the next section, we show how to use
Corella framework for the classification and the autoencoder
tasks, as two popular examples of supervised and unsupervised
learning tasks.
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g¯Post
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Fig. 2: Corella for classification
Remark 2: One of the interesting aspects of Corella frame-
work is that the servers don’t communicate with each other at
all. Indeed, they may not be even aware of the existence of
the other servers.
III. CORELLA IN ACTION
The objective in this section is to use Corella framework
to develop two learning algorithms, (1) privacy-preserving
classification, based on deep neural networks, and (2) privacy-
preserving autoencoder, as classical examples for supervised
and unsupervised learning, respectively.
A. Classification Using Deep Neural Netwoks
In this task, the client wishes to label his data, using N
servers, where up to T of them may collude. In this problem,
Y is the label of X . The structure of the algorithm has been
shown in Fig. 2. Here, we explain the different components
of the proposed algorithm.
1) Correlated joint distribution PZ: The following steps
describe how we generate samples of Z. First a matrix W ∈
RT×N is formed, such that any submatrix of size T × T of
W is full rank. Then a random matrix Z¯ = [Z¯1, . . . , Z¯T ] ∈
Rs×T , independent of X , is formed where each entry is chosen
independently and identically from N(0, σ2
Z¯
), where s is the
size of each query and σ2
Z¯
is a positive real number, denoting
the variance of each entry. Then, let Z be
Z 4= [Z1, . . . , ZN ] = Z¯W. (5)
2) Preprocessing function gPre : This function, which gen-
erates the queries, consists of three blocks: (i) the sample
vector X is passed through a neural network with learnable
parameters, denoted by g¯Pre ; (ii) the output of first block,
U = g¯Pre (X), is Normalized to Uˆ (as defined in the notation
I-B); (iii) the query of the j-th server, Q j , is generated by
adding the noise component Z j to Uˆ . Therefore,
Q j = G(X) + Z j = Normalized(g¯Pre (X)) + Z j . (6)
Since the client has limited computing resources, g¯Pre can
be a neural network with one layer or even an identity
function. As there is no a priori bound on the range of
the output of a neural network (e.g., g¯Pre ), the advantage of
Normalized(·) function is that provides such a bound. As we
will see in Subsection III-A6, a large enough noise variance
σ2
Z¯
is sufficient to make the constraint of optimization (4) be
satisfied, independent of the choice of g¯Pre function.
3) Post-processing function gPost : We form gPost by running
a neural network with learnable parameters, denoted by g¯Post ,
over the sum of the received answers from the servers.
Therefore,
Yˆ = g¯Post (A) = g¯Post
( N∑
j=1
Aj
)
. (7)
To limit the burden of the computation and storage on the
client, we desire to keep these costs at the client side low.
Hence in the implementation, we allocate at most a single-
layer neural network to g¯Pre and g¯Post .
4) Functions f1 to fN : These functions are chosen as some
multi-layer neural networks with learnable parameters. The
parameters of f1 to fN will be different.
5) Training: To train the learnable parameters of F , we
use some a particular form of gradient descent optimization
algorithms to minimize the loss of optimization (4). In other
words, we train a model, consisting of N separate neural
networks f1 to fN and two networks g¯Pre and g¯Post . The details
of this method are presented in Algorithm 1. In this algorithm,
the parameters of the model are denoted by θ and the training
batch size is indicated by b.
5Algorithm 1 Corella: ε-privacy with N servers, up to T
colluding
input: Sm, σZ¯ , W, g¯Pre (·; θg¯Pre ), g¯Post (·; θg¯Post ), fj(·; θ fj ), b
output: PZ and updated g¯Pre (·; θg¯Pre ), g¯Post (·; θg¯Post ), fj(·; θ fj )
i ← 1, . . . , b
s← the output size of g¯Pre (·; θg¯Pre )
function PZ
Draw s × T i.i.d. noise samples from N(0, σ2
Z¯
)
Shape the noise samples to s × T matrix Z¯
Compute the noise components
[Z1, . . . , ZN ] ← Z¯W
return (Z1, . . . , ZN )
end
for the number of training iterations do
Forward path:
Draw b minibatch samples from Sm
{(X (1),Y (1)), . . . , (X (b),Y (b))}
Draw b i.i.d. noise samples from PZ
{(Z (1)1 , . . . , Z (1)N ), . . . , (Z (b)1 , . . . , Z (b)N )}
Compute the client features
U (i) ← g¯Pre (X (i); θg¯Pre )
Normalize the client features
Uˆ
(i) ← Normalized(U (i))
for j = 1, . . . , N do
Compute the query of the j-th server
Q(i)j ← Uˆ
(i)
+ Z (i)j
Compute the answer of the j-th server
A(i)j ← fj(Q(i)j ; θ fj )
end
Compute the sum of the answers
A(i) ← ∑Nj=1 A(i)j
Compute the client predicted labels
Yˆ
(i) ← g¯Post (A(i); θg¯Post )
Compute the loss
L(θg¯Pre , θg¯Post , θ f1, . . . , θ fN ) ← 1b
∑
i
L{Yˆ (i),Y (i)}
Backward path:
The backpropagation (BP) algorithm:
Update θg¯Post
for j = 1, . . . , N do
Compute the BP of the client to the j-th server
Update θ fj
Compute the BP of the j-th server to the client
end
Update θg¯Pre
end
6) Proof of privacy preserving: In Theorem 1, we show
that the proposed method satisfies ε-privacy, if
σ2
Z¯
≥ 1
2 ln 2
ps/ε, (8)
where s is the size of each query and
p = max
Ω∈W
{®1>(ΩΩ>)−1®1} ∈ R+. (9)
W denotes the set of all T×T submatrices of W and ®1 denotes
the all-ones vector with length T .
Theorem 1 (ε-privacy). Let X be a random vector, sampled
from some distribution PX , Z = [Z1, . . . , ZN ] and Q =
[Q1, . . . ,QN ] as defined in (5) and (6). If conditions (8) and
(9) are satisfied, then for all T ⊂ {1, . . . , N} of size T , we
have
I(X ; {Q j, j ∈ T }) ≤ ε. (10)
Proof. Let K = E[G(X)G(X)T ] denote the covariance matrix
of G(X). Since G(X) is Normalized, then tr(K) = s. In
addition, consider the set T = {t1, . . . , tT }, where T ⊂ [N]
and |T | = T , also let ΩT = W(:,T), and QT = [Qt1, . . . ,QtT ].
Then, we have
QT = [G(X), Z¯][®1,Ω>T]>, (11)
where Z¯ is defined in III-A1. In addition, we define
[ω1, . . . , ωT ] = ®1>Ω−1T . (12)
Thus we have,
I(X ; {Q j, j ∈ T }) = I(X ; QT)
(a)
= I(X ; QTΩ−1T ) = h(QTΩ−1T ) − h(QTΩ−1T |X)
(b)
= h(ω1G(X) + Z¯1, . . . , ωTG(X) + Z¯T ) − h(Z¯)
(c)≤
T∑
t=1
(
h(ωtG(X) + Z¯ t ) − h(Z¯ t )
)
(d)≤
T∑
t=1
1
2
(
log
((2pie)s det(ω2t K + σ2Z¯ Is)) − log(2pieσ2Z¯ )s)
(e)≤ 1
2
T∑
t=1
(
log
(( 1
σ2
Z¯
)s(
tr(ω2t K + σ2Z¯ Is)
s
)s ) )
(f)
=
s
2
T∑
t=1
log(
ω2t + σ
2
Z¯
σ2
Z¯
) (g)≤ s
2 ln 2
T∑
t=1
ω2t
σ2
Z¯
(h)≤ ε,
where (a) follows since ΩT is a full rank matrix; (b) follows
from (11), (12) and the fact that Z¯ is independent of X ;
(c) follows from inequality h(A, B) ≤ h(A) + h(B) for any
two random vectors A and B, and the fact that the set of
random vectors {Z¯1, . . . , Z¯T } is mutually independent; (d)
follows because Z¯ is independent of X and jointly Gaussian
distribution maximizes the entropy of a random vector with a
known covariance matrix [36]; (e) follows from the fact that
by considering a symmetric and positive semi-definite matrix
H = ω2t K+σ2Z¯ Is with eigenvalues λk , we have det(H) =
s∏
k=1
λk
and tr(H) =
s∑
k=1
λk , and therefore we obtain det(H) ≤ ( tr(H)s )s
using the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means; (f)
follows since tr(K) = s; (g) follows due to ln(x + 1) ≤ x;
and (h) follows from (8), (9), (12), and by substituting
T∑
t=1
ω2t =
®1>(ΩTΩ>T)−1®1 ≤ p.

In the next section, we will evaluate the performance of the
proposed scheme for several datasets.
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(a) Scenario 1: Offloading the encoding stage
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(b) Scenario 2: Offloading the decoding stage
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(c) Scenario 3: Offloading both encoding and
decoding stages
Fig. 3: The method in the autoencoder task
B. Autoencoder
As an example of an unsupervised task, here we focus
on autoencoder. An autoencoder has two stages: an encoding
stage and a decoding stage. In the encoding stage, the client
wishes to compress X to a latent Lj ∈ Rl , and store latent Lj
in the j-th server, and at a later time, in the decoding stage,
reconstruct X from latent Lj , for j = 1 . . . N . The real number
RCompression = xl indicates the compression ratio, where x and
l denote the size of X and Lj , respectively. In this problem,
Y is equal to X . Here we explain the components of the
algorithm. In terms of the process of the noise generating we
follow the same steps as explained in Subsection III-A (see
(5)). For other components, we have three different scenarios
(shown in Fig. 3):
1) Scenario 1: Offloading The Encoding Stage (Fig. 3a):
In this scenario the client wishes to offload the encoding stage
to the servers. To generate the queries by gPre , the client passes
X through g¯Pre and then normalizes the output to Uˆ . Having
noise component Z j , he sends query Q j = Uˆ + Z j to the j-
th server. The j-th server applies fj to encode and compress
received query Q j to latent Lj ∈ Rl , and then stores Lj . When
the client wants to reconstruct X , the j-th server sends Aj = Lj
to the client. The client passes the sum of received answers,
i.e., A =
∑N
j=1 Aj , through function g¯Post , which implements
the decoding stage, to recover X˜ (as an estimation of X). In
this problem, we desire that the computation and storage costs
of function g¯Pre be low. Hence in the implementation, we may
set g¯Pre equal to an identity function.
2) Scenario 2: Offloading The Decoding Stage (Fig. 3b):
In this scenario the client wishes to offload the decoding stage
to the servers. Here function gPre consists of both the encoding
stage and the query generating processes, and is done at the
client side. The client uses g¯Pre to compress X to U ∈ Rl , then
he normalizes the output to Uˆ , and sends query Q j = Uˆ + Z j
to the j-th server. The j-th server stores latent Lj = Q j ∈ Rl .
When the client wants to reconstruct X , the j-th server uses
fj to decode and decompress Lj to Aj and send answer Aj to
the client. Then, the client passes A =
∑N
j=1 Aj through g¯Post to
recover X˜ . Here, we desire that the computation and storage
costs of g¯Post be low. Thus in the implementation, we may set
g¯Post equal to an identity function.
3) Scenario 3: Offloading Both Encoding and Decoding
Stages (Fig. 3c): In this scenario the client wishes to offload
both encoding and decoding stages to the servers. To generate
the queries by gPre , the client passes X through g¯Pre and
normalizes the output to Uˆ , and then sends query Q j = Uˆ+Z j
to the j-th server. The j-th server applies f encj to compress
the received query to latent Lj ∈ Rl , and then stores Lj . When
the client wants to reconstruct X , the j-th server applies f decj
to decode Lj to Aj and send Aj to the client. The client passes
the sum of received answers, i.e., A =
∑N
j=1 Aj , through g¯Post
to reconstruct X˜ . In this scenario, fj(.) = f decj ( f encj (.)) and
we desire to have low computation and storage costs for g¯Pre
and g¯Post . Hence in the implementation, we may set both g¯Pre
and g¯Post equal to an identity function.
Model training and poof of privacy-preserving in this al-
gorithm are the same as discussed in Subsection III-A (see
III-A5 and III-A6).
IV. EXPERIMENTS
This section is dedicated to reporting simulation results. In
Subsection IV-A, the implementation details of the proposed
method is presented. In Subsections IV-B and IV-C, the
performance of the proposed method is evaluated for the
classification and the autoencoder tasks, respectively.
7TABLE I: Network structure. Normalized(·) function, normalizes its input as defined in the notation I-B. Conv2d parameters
represent the number of the input channels, the number of the output channels, the kernel size, the stride, and the padding of
a 2D convolutional layer, respectively. FC parameters represent the number of the input neurons and the number of the output
neurons of a fully connected layer. BatchNorm2d and BatchNorm1d parameters represent the number of the input channels
and the number of the input neurons respectively for batch normalization layer.
N(Iden. → Iden.) N(Iden. → no) N(ni → Iden.) N(ni → no)
g¯Pre Identity function Identity function
Conv2d (ci ,ni,(5,5),3,0)
BatchNorm2d (ni)
ReLU
Conv2d (ci ,ni,(5,5),3,0)
BatchNorm2d (ni)
ReLU
f j
Normalized (·)
Conv2d (ci ,64,(5,5),3,0)
BatchNorm2d (64)
ReLU
Conv2d (64,128,(3,3),1,0)
BatchNorm2d (128)
ReLU
Flatten
FC (128*8*8,1024)
BatchNorm1d (1024)
ReLU
FC (1024,10)
Normalized (·)
Conv2d (ci ,64,(5,5),3,0)
BatchNorm2d (64)
ReLU
Conv2d (64,128,(3,3),1,0)
BatchNorm2d (128)
ReLU
Flatten
FC (128*8*8,1024)
BatchNorm1d (1024)
ReLU
FC (1024,no)
Normalized (·)
Conv2d (ni,128,(3,3),1,0)
BatchNorm2d (128)
ReLU
Flatten
FC (128*8*8,1024)
BatchNorm1d (1024)
ReLU
FC (1024,10)
Normalized (·)
Conv2d (ni,128,(3,3),1,0)
BatchNorm2d (128)
ReLU
Flatten
FC (128*8*8,1024)
BatchNorm1d (1024)
ReLU
FC (1024,no)
g¯Post Identity function
ReLU
FC (no,10)
Identity function ReLUFC (no,10)
A. The Implementation Details
For the classification and the autoencoder tasks, the pro-
posed algorithm is evaluated for MNIST [37], Fashion-MNIST
[38], and Cifar-10 [39] datasets by using their standard training
sets and testing sets. Furthermore, for the autoencoder task, we
evaluate the method for CelebA dataset [40]. The only used
preprocessings on images are Random Crop and Random Hor-
izontal Flip on Cifar-10 training dataset for the classification
task, and padding MNIST and Fashion-MNIST images on all
sides with zeros of length 4 to fit in a network with input size
32 × 32. We set the training batch size equal to 128.
We employ Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) in g¯Pre ,
fj , and g¯Post . We initialize the network parameters by Kaiming
initialization [41]. For each value of the standard deviation
of the noise, we continue the learning process until the loss
converges, i.e., when the difference in consecutive losses
diminishes. We also use Adam optimizer [42] and decrease
the learning rate from 10−3 to 2 × 10−5 gradually during the
training. For N = 2 and T = 1, we choose
W1×2 =
[
1 −1] .
For N = 3 and T = 2, we choose
W2×3 =
[
0
√
3
4 −
√
3
4
1 − 12 − 12
]
.
For N = 4 and T = 3, we choose
W3×4 =

0
√
8
9 −
√
2
9 −
√
2
9
0 0
√
2
3 −
√
2
3
1 − 13 − 13 − 13
 .
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Fig. 4: Results on the accuracy versus the epoch number, for
noise level σZ¯ = 70, N = 2, T = 1, and N(Iden. → Iden.)
model on MNIST dataset in Experiment 1.
For N = 5 and T = 2, we choose
W2×5 =
[
sin 0α sin 1α sin 2α sin 3α sin 4α
cos 0α cos 1α cos 2α cos 3α cos 4α
]
,
where α = 2pi5 .
B. The Classification Task
In this setup, fj is a neural network with several con-
volutional layers and two fully connected layers with the
Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) activation function (see Table I
for details). To limit the computation cost of the pre- and post-
processings at the client, we use at most one convolutional
layer in g¯Pre and at most one fully connected layer in g¯Post .
In particular, g¯Pre is either an identity function, denoted by
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Fig. 5: The results of Experiment 1.
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Fig. 6: The joint distribution of (A[6], A[9]) in the first row
and (A1[6], A1[9]) in the second row for a sample with label
”6” for various the standard deviation of the noise (i.e., σZ¯ )
in Expriment 1.
Iden., or a convolutional layer with ni ∈ N output channels.
In addition, g¯Post can be a fully connected layer, with a vector
of length no ∈ N as the input, and generating 10 outputs,
representing 10 different classes. The input vector of length
no is formed by adding the N vectors of length no, received
the from servers. In addition, we also consider a very simple
case for g¯Post , where no = 10 and at the client side, we simply
add up the vectors of length no, received from the servers. In
other words, in this case g¯Post is equal to the identity function.
We represent the structure of g¯Pre and g¯Post by N(ni → no),
where the number of the output channels at g¯Pre is equal to ni
(with the exception that ni = Iden. means g¯Pre is the identity
function, i.e., g¯Pre (X) = X), and the number of the output
neurons at fj is equal to no (with the exception that no = Iden.
means g¯Post (A) = A). In Table I, ci denotes the number of the
input image channels. Since the variance of the input queries
can be high (see equation (6)) we use Normalized(.) function
at the first stage of fj . We use the cross-entropy loss function
between Y and softmax(Yˆ ) for L{Yˆ,Y }.
1) Experiment 1: In this experiment, we focus on MNIST
dataset, and consider a system with N = 2 servers, no
colluding (T = 1). In addition, we use identity mapping for
both g¯Pre and g¯Post . This means the number of the output
neurons at the servers is 10 and we simply add the received
answers of the servers to find the label of the client data.
This case is denoted by N(Iden.→ Iden.). Fig. 4 reports the
accuracy for the testing and training dataset versus the training
epoch number for σZ¯ = 70, representing a very strong noise.
This figure shows that the proposed approach allows the model
of the servers to train in presence of the strong but correlated
noises, such that the client can mitigate the contribution of the
noises by combining the outputs of the servers.
Fig. 5a reports the accuracy for the testing dataset at the
end of the training phase versus σZ¯ and ε for different σZ¯
ranging from 0 to 70. It shows that using Corella, the client
achieves 90% accuracy while the privacy leakage is less than
ε = 0.12, thanks to the strong noise with σZ¯ = 70. Also, this
figure visualizes the inputs and the outputs of the servers for
an MNIST sample in this experiment. As you can see, when
logσZ¯ = 6, the input of each server is severely noisy, and
we cannot identify the label of the input from it. Still, the
client can detect the label with high accuracy. Fig. 5b shows
the answer of each server (which is a vector of length 10),
where the correct label is ”8” and σZ¯ = 70. As you can see,
in the answer of an individual server (A1 and A2), the correct
label (here ”8”) does not rank among the labels with highest
values. However, when we add the values correspondingly, ”8”
has the highest value in the result. In particular, after applying
softmax, the density on the correct label is significantly higher
than the rest. This observation intuitively confirms the privacy
and accuracy of the proposed Corella method.
A similar effect is shown in Fig. 6. In this figure, we use a
test sample from MNIST dataset with label ”6” as the input.
We want to visualize how each server is confused about the
correct label (here ”6”), with an incorrect one (say ”9”). Each
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Fig. 7: The privacy and accuracy curves (The results of Experiment 2)
plot in the second row of Fig. 6 is a 2D-plot histogram,
representing the joint distribution of two neurons of the output
of server one, i.e., A1[6] and A1[9] (A1[6] on the x-axis and
A1[9] on the y-axis). We have this figure for different values
of σZ¯ . If the point (A1[6], A1[9]) is above the line y = x, i.e.,
A1[9] > A1[6], it means that server one incorrectly prefers
label ”9” to label ”6”. In the first row in Fig. 6, we have the
same plots for A[9] versus A[6], where A = A1+A2. As we can
see, even for large noise (i.e., σZ¯ = 70), server one chooses
”6” or ”9” almost equiprobably, while the client almost always
chooses the label correctly. This shows that, in our proposed
method, simultaneous training of the two networks f1 and f2
on the correlated queries allows the system to be trained such
that the distribution of the noise at the output of the system
does not confuse the client about the correct label (see the first
row in Fig. 6).
2) Experiment 2: In this part, we evaluate the performance
of the proposed method for N = 2 and T = 1, for three
different datasets, including MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and
CIFAR-10, and for various levels of noise. In addition, we
compare the performance of the method, with the case where
we have only one server and we add noise to the input to
protect privacy of the data. For the system with one server,
we train the model, in the presence of noise. For each dataset,
we plot the accuracy of the proposed method for two models
and σZ¯ = 0 to 70. Figures 7a, 7b, and 7c demonstrate both
the accuracy of the proposed method and the accuracy of the
system with one server, versus log ε and σZ¯ . Figures 7d, 7e,
and 7f compare the accuracy of the proposed method with
the case with one server. Figures 7a, 7b, and 7c show that
unlike the systems with one server, Corella achieves a good
accuracy for various datasets, even for high level of noises.
For example, in Fig. 7a, the client with low post-processing
in N(Iden. → 32) achieves 95% accuracy for σZ¯ = 70,
while with a single server and adding noise with the same
variance, we can achieve 13% accuracy (see Fig. 7d). This
comparison emphasizes on the fact that having more than
one server with correlated noise world allow the system to
mitigate the contribution of the noise, even when the noise
is strong. However with one server, even with training, the
system cannot eliminate the noise. Thus, the ability of noise
mitigation in Corella follows not only from training in the
presence of noise but also the fact that we have more than
one server and the noises are correlated. In general, although
the accuracy of Corella decreases with increasing the variance
of the noise, it still converges to a reasonable value.
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TABLE II: Test accuracy in the classification task, for various models and different tuple (N,T). The test accuracy for MNIST,
Fashion-MNIST, and Cifar-10 is evaluated for log ε = 0, 0, and 1.5, respectively (The results of Experiment 3).
Dataset Model sImage Size
Cc(g)
Cc( fj )
Cs(g)
Cs( fj )
Accuracy for (N,T)
(2, 1) (3, 2) (4, 3) (5, 2)
MNIST
N(Iden.→ Iden.) 1 0 0 90.72 90.52 90.23 91.02
N(Iden.→ 32) 1 3.1e-5 5.1e-5 95.16 95.10 94.87 95.78
N(Iden.→ 64) 1 6.3e-5 9.9e-5 96.40 95.57 94.82 96.73
N(1→ Iden.) 1.0e-1 3.1e-4 4.0e-6 90.53 - - -
N(2→ Iden.) 2.1e-1 6.2e-4 8.1e-6 94.21 - - -
Fashion-MNIST
N(Iden.→ Iden.) 1 0 0 81.00 80.45 80.13 81.39
N(Iden.→ 32) 1 3.1e-5 5.1e-5 83.32 82.45 82.04 83.88
N(Iden.→ 64) 1 6.3e-5 9.9e-5 84.00 - - -
N(Iden.→ 128) 1 1.2e-4 1.9e-4 83.02 - - -
N(2→ Iden.) 2.1e-1 6.2e-4 8.1e-6 81.69 - - -
N(4→ Iden.) 4.1e-1 1.2e-3 1.6e-5 83.35 - - -
N(8→ Iden.) 8.3e-1 2.4e-3 3.2e-5 81.51 - - -
N(4→ 32) 4.1e-1 1.3e-3 6.7e-5 83.13 - - -
Cifar-10
N(Iden.→ Iden.) 1 0 0 35.70 35.47 35.12 36.82
N(Iden.→ 32) 1 2.3e-5 3.9e-5 38.30 - - -
N(Iden.→ 64) 1 4.7e-5 7.6e-5 42.47 - - -
N(Iden.→ 128) 1 9.3e-5 1.5e-4 42.28 - - -
N(8→ Iden.) 2.6e-1 6.7e-3 7.2e-5 50.30 - - -
N(16→ Iden.) 5.2e-1 1.3e-2 1.4e-4 54.39 - - -
N(32→ Iden.) 1.0 2.2e-2 2.9e-4 58.13 - - -
N(64→ Iden.) 2.1 3.7e-2 5.7e-4 55.27 - - -
N(32→ 128) 1.0 2.2e-2 4.3e-4 58.16 58.02 57.63 60.39
3) Experiment 3: In this experiment, we discuss the client
costs in terms of the computation, storage, and communication.
In Table II, we evaluate the proposed algorithm for various
models and values for (N,T). We report the test accuracy for
three datasets and the computation and storage costs of the
client relative to the computation and storage costs of one of
the servers. In this table, Cc(·) and Cs(·) denote the number
of products (representing computational complexity) and the
number of the parameters (representing storage complexity) in
a model, respectively. In addition, we report the size of each
query, denoted by s, relative to the size of the client data (the
image size).
In this table, the difference in the cost of the client and
each server (in terms of computational and storage complexity)
is quite evident. On the other hand, the communication load
between the client and each server is low, which is in the order
of the size of X (in the stage of sending query), and in the
order of the size of Y (in the stage of receiving answer). The
low costs of computation and communication at the client side,
and the guarantee of good accuracy make Corella framework
suitable for practical use cases in mobile devices and the
internet of things (IoT).
C. The Autoencoder Task
In this experiment, we evaluate the proposed method for
the autoencoder task. The network structures of Encoder(·)
and Decoder(·) are presented in Table III. In this table, ci
and co denote the number of channels of the input image
(i.e., the client data) and the latent, respectively. As detailed
in Table III, the encoder includes three convolutional layers.
TABLE III: The network structures of the encoder and the
decoder. ConvT2d represents the transposed convolutional
layer, and its parameters denote the number of the input
channels, the number of the output channels, the kernel size,
the stride, and the padding, respectively.
Encoder(·) Decoder(·)
Normalized (·)
Conv2d (ci ,12,(4,4),2,1)
BatchNorm2d (12)
ReLU
Conv2d (12,24,(4,4),2,1)
BatchNorm2d (24)
ReLU
Conv2d (24,co,(4,4),2,1)
BatchNorm2d (co)
ReLU
Normalized (·)
ConvT2d (co,24,(4,4),2,1)
BatchNorm2d (24)
ReLU
ConvT2d (24,12,(4,4),2,1)
BatchNorm2d (12)
ReLU
ConvT2d (12,ci ,(4,4),2,1)
Similarly, the decoder is composed of three transposed convo-
lutional layers. We choose the network structures of g¯Pre , fj ,
and g¯Post as follows: (i) in offloading the encoding stage (Sce-
nario 1), g¯Pre (X) = X , fj(Q j) = Encoder(Q j), and g¯Post (A) =
Decoder(A); (ii) in offloading the decoding stage (Scenario 2),
g¯Pre (X) = Encoder(X), fj(Q j) = Decoder(Q j), and g¯Post (A) =
A; (iii) in offloading both encoding and decoding stages
(Scenario 3), g¯Pre (X) = X , fj(Q j) = Decoder(Encoder(Q j)),
and g¯Post (A) = A. We use the mean squared error (MSE) loss
between sigmoid(Yˆ ) and Y for L{Yˆ,Y }, where Y is equal to
image X , Yˆ denotes the output of the model, and the range
of the pixels of image X is [0, 1].
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Fig. 8: The client image reconstruction. Visualization of the different the input images, the queries, the answers, and the
reconstructed images in the three scenarios for compression ratio of RCompression = 8, (N,T) = (2, 1), and log ε = 0, 2, and 4
(The results of Experiment 4).
1) Experiment 4: At first, we evaluate our proposed
method for CelebA dataset for the compression ratio
RCompression = 8, (N,T) = (2, 1), and log ε = 0, 2, and 4.
When each layer of the encoder halves the height and width
of its input (see Table III), the latent size is equal to co× h8 × w8 ,
where h and w represent the height and the width of the input
image. Thus RCompression =
ci×h×w
co× h8 ×w8
=
64×ci
co
. As a result,
for RCompression = 8, we choose co = 24, noting that CelebA
images have 3 color channels (i.e., ci = 3). Fig. 8 visualizes
the input image (X), the queries (Q1 and Q2), the answers (A1
and A2), and the reconstructed image (Xˆ = sigmoid(Yˆ )), for
different images from CelebA dataset. To plot the latent, we
reshape it to an image with three channels. This figure shows
that Corella method allows the client to offload privately the
computational tasks of the encoder or the decoder, and then
reconstruct the images, with high quality (shown in Fig. 8a
and Fig. 8b), or offload both the computational tasks of the
encoder and the decoder, and then reconstruct the images, with
acceptable quality (shown in Fig. 8c).
Remark 3: For Scenario 3, one may suggest an alternative
but naive method as follows. We train two autoencoders
separately, one to encode X + Z and decode its latent to back
X + Z , and the other to encode X − Z and decode its latent
to X − Z , where Z is a noise with high variance. Then the
client adds the outputs from the two decoders to reconstruct X .
While this approach might seem reasonable, it doesn’t work
in practice. The reason is that X + Z has a very high entropy,
and thus cannot be compressed to a short latent and then be
recovered accurately. The same statement holds for X − Z .
The reason that Corella overcomes this problem is that in
Corella, both servers are trained simultaneously such that the
final result at the client is accurate. However, the input and
the output of the autoencoder in each server are not similar at
all. Fig. 8c demonstrates this observation clearly.
One may ask if a single server can recover the original
image from the query of one of the servers (say server one),
if it is trained to. We evaluate this scenario and report in Fig. 9.
Fig. 9a shows the result if we train a single server to recover
the image from the query of server one in scenario two, while
Fig. 9b shows the same result if a server is trained to recover
the image from the query of server one in scenarios one and
three. These figures show that reconstructing client image from
the query received by one server is almost impossible.
In Table IV, we report the experimental results for various
datasets, compression ratios, different scenarios, and tuples
(N,T). In this table, the client loss and the server loss are
denoted by lCl and lSe, respectively. The server loss is equal
to the loss of the image reconstruction when T servers collude
and run a neural network, to reconstruct the client image
from their queries. The network structure is the same as
what described in Table III, where the T received queries are
concatenated in the input. This means that we set the number
of the input channels (c0 in Scenario 2 and ci in Scenario 1
and Scenario 3) equal to T times the number of channels of a
single query. These results show that the difference between
the client loss and the server loss is significant. Therefore,
while T colluding servers learn nothing from the received
queries, the client can recover the image with good quality.
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Fig. 9: The image reconstruction from the query of server one. In Fig. 9a, one server is trained to reconstruct the image from
the query of server one in scenario two, and in Fig. 9b from the query of server one in scenario one and three.
TABLE IV: The client loss and the ratio of the server loss to the client loss for the three scenarios of the offloading autoencoder
tasks, compression ratio of RCompression = 4 and 8, and (N,T) = (2, 1) and (3, 2) for log ε = 0. (The results of Experiment 4).
Dataset (N,T) RCompression Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
lCl lSe /lCl lCl lSe /lCl lCl lSe /lCl
MNIST
(2,1) 4 0.00219 22.9 0.00215 25.3 0.00536 9.48 0.00466 10.8 0.00494 11.0 0.00947 5.3
(3,2) 4 0.00324 15.5 0.00312 17.5 0.00755 6.78 0.00477 10.5 0.00624 8.7 0.01240 4.1
Fashion-MNIST
(2,1) 4 0.00402 14.8 0.00521 12.2 0.00930 6.48 0.00571 10.4 0.00784 8.1 0.01175 5.1
(3,2) 4 0.00451 13.3 0.00604 10.4 0.01135 5.38 0.00617 9.7 0.00907 7.0 0.01359 4.4
Cifar10
(2,1) 4 0.00181 31.0 0.00366 15.3 0.00615 9.18 0.00255 22.0 0.00435 12.8 0.00667 8.4
(3,2) 4 0.00305 18.3 0.00550 10.2 0.00809 6.98 0.00356 15.7 0.00580 9.7 0.00801 7.0
CelebA
(2,1) 4 0.00138 61.8 0.00820 10.4 0.00969 8.88 0.00164 52.0 0.00928 9.3 0.01012 8.4
(3,2) 4 0.00169 50.4 0.00950 9.1 0.01010 8.48 0.00180 47.4 0.01252 6.9 0.01309 6.5
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose Corella as a privacy-preserving
framework for offloading machine learning algorithms. This
is particularly important for mobile devices that have limited
computing resources. In Corella, we add strong noise to the
data before sending it to each server. However, to provide
an opportunity to mitigate the resulting confusion and so
guarantee a reasonable accuracy, the added noises to different
servers are designed to be correlated. Unlike MPC that guar-
antees that added noises will be eliminated completely through
carefully designed excessive interaction among the servers (or
alternatively using many servers), in Corella, the servers are
trained to mitigate the effect of noise. Interestingly, with this
method, we simultaneously achieve a high level of accuracy
and a high level of privacy, with only a few servers (e.g.,
just two), and without any communication among the servers.
Indeed, in Corella framework, in the process of training the
model to predict the result (e.g., label) accurately, the model
is also trained to mitigate the effect of the noises. Correlation
among the noises provides the chance for this training to be
successful, which is confirmed experimentally.
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